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FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OB-

S.] The Supreme Court has long protected
the privacy of the individual by
excluding evidence obtained by
virtue of unreasonable search and
seizure, even though such a rule
was in derogation of the common
law that evidence from an illegal
source was admissible. Against
such a background, the Court, apparently influenced by the wave of
lawlessness that accompanied the
Volstead Act, held by a divided
court in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438 (1928) that wire tapping did not violate the search and
seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and its introduction into
evidence was not self incrimination within the purview of the
Fifth Amendment. A vigorous dissent by Brandeis pointed out that
a liberal construction of the
Amendments should be made to
give effect to their underlying purpose, i.e. to prevent "unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual."
Subsequently section 605 of the
TAINED EVIDENCE.-[U.

Federal Communications Act, 48
Stat. 1064,1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A.
§605 (1939), was passed which provided that "no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or published the existence,
contents . . ." In the first Nardone
case, 302 U. S. 379 (1937); (1938)
29 J. Crim. L. 134, the Supreme
Court interpreted this section to
bar the direct introduction of wire
tapping evidence. The Court suggested that the probable congressional policy was to protect the
privacy of the individual, even
though it is achieved at the expense of leaving unpunished many
lawbreakers. However, the history
of the act, plus a congressional reluctance to legislate expressly
against wire tapping, suggests a
strained construction of the statute,
and that the policy was really that
of the Court's instead of Congress.
And in light of such, the holding
must be acknowledged as a strong
tendency toward the Brandeis dissent in the Olmstead case.
Recently, the "second" Nardone
case, in interpreting the same section, amplified the holding of the
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earlier case. Nardone sought to
strike the testimony of certain of
the prosecution's witnesses on the
ground that the prosecution had
discovered the existence of these
witnesses and their knowledge of
the alleged past criminal acts by
means of the taps. The trial court
overruled the motion to strike and
the jury found Nardone guilty. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant had the right, if promptly
asserted, to strike the testimony,
by showing that it was secured by
derivative use of wire tapping information. Nardone v. U. S., 60 S.
Ct. 266 (1939).
The court is ambiguous as to the
extent of its holding, but seems to
suggest some limitation for it declares "as a matter of good sense,
however, such connection [between
the illegal wire tapping and the
testimony] may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the
t;int." It warns against using this
decision as a means to bar competent evidence by "sophisticated
arguments" proving a causal connection between the wire tapping
and the government proof, and declares that the means for avoiding
such abuse, "ought to be within the
reach of experienced trial judges."
It is hard to draw any lines on the
basis of such a nebulous formula.
While the holding seems to exclude
evidence of past criminal conduct
obtained directly through wire tapping information it leaves open the
question of whether testimony of
a witness who was present at the
scene of the crime as the result of
wire tapping information, would
be competent. Perhaps, the court
would hold that the testimony of
witnesses in such a situation would
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be dissipated of the taint of wire
tapping.
In addition to using wire tapping
information sufficiently remote to
fall without the derivative use
doctrine of the second Nardone
case, the possibility remains that
the taint may be removed by obtaining the consent of the sender
as provided in the statute. In
Weiss v. United States, 60 S. Ct.
269 (1939) a companion case to the
second Nardone decision, the government attempted to do just this
by having the sender of the message turn state's evidence. Records
of telephone conversations were
played to several defendants and
under the influence of promised
leniency they consented to the use
in evidence of these transcripts.
The court held this consent was
not sufficient under the statute because it was not voluntary but secured by pressure which existed in
part from the fact that the government already knew of the sender's
criminal acts through the wire taps.
Since such knowledge will almost
invariably accompany any turning
of state's evidence, this important
means of avoiding the prohibition
of section 605 and aiding criminal
prosecution seems fairly well
closed. The court does, however,
leave open the possibility of introducing wire tapping evidence where
the consent of the sender was obtained without coercion.
But the Weiss case has a more
important aspect. The first Nardone case involved the tapping of
interstate communications only.
After the latter case, the lower
federal courts reached conflicting
decisions as to whether the statute
covered tapping of intrastate communications. The Weiss case re-
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solved the conflict by holding that
intrastate communications are
within the purview of the Act. The
Court inferred that Congress, under
the analogy of the Shreveport case,
234 U. S. 342 (1914), intended to
protect interstate communications
by prohibiting the tapping of intrastate communications. Exactly why
the protection to interstate communication should extend so far is
not made clear, unless, as the defendant contended, the inability of
the interceptor to distinguish between inter and intrastate messages required that he be barred
from intercepting either. Under
this reasoning, the statute would.
not be applicable to wires, such as
house phones, which are devoid of
interstate communications. Tapping
of such by federal agents would
bring the validity of the Olmstead
case, supra, directly into question.
Akin to the question of extending the statute to intrastate wires
for federal purposes, is the use of
wire taps by state officers to obtain
evidence for prosecution in the
state courts. An attempt to stop
such practice by reversing decisions based on such evidence
would raise the grave constitutional question of whether the interstate commerce clause gives
Congress the power to invade the
procedure in the state courts in
this manner. See (1940) 34 Ill. L.
Rev. 758. In line with this is the
question of the application of the
penal provisions of section 501 of
the Act on state officers tapping
wires in the enforcement of state
laws. This latter is not quite so
close a case as the prohibiting of
the introduction of the wire information into evidence. The violation is more direct in the sense
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that the wording expressly forbids
such, and in the sense that the offense involves a direct burdening
of the interstate commerce. Hence,
there is less of a possibility of violation of the Tenth Amendment.
In addition, it should be noted that
many states have laws forbidding
wire tapping, but they ordinarily
have not been a bar to the introduction of evidence. See (1940)
34 Ill. L. Rev. 758, 761, footnote 22
cases and statutes. A narrow construction of the federal statute
would leave the burden of stopping
wire tapping on the efficacy of
these laws. The interpretation
given the Federal Communications
Act by the Supreme Court in the
principal cases, undoubtedly will
be very persuasive on the state
courts in construing their own
statutes in the future.
Even assuming that wire tapping
evidence will be barred in the
state courts, the question remains
whether the statute has destroyed
all motives for law enforcing
agencies to tap wires. Agents still
may tap wires, if for no other purpose than to substantiate and
clarify their investigations, and
perhaps, prevent crimes. The fact
that the information may not be
introduced into evidence, or be derivatively used to obtain such,
would not destroy the function of
the tap in this respect. This possibility is strengthened by the wording of the statute which emphasizes
the divulgence rather than the interception as the crime. Thus, the
officers may tap so long as they do
not expose the contents of the message. In addition, there is the
practical difficulty of proving that
the evidence came from a wire
tap. It would not be very hard for
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the prosecution to fabricate a
source of evidence independent of
the interception.
Moreover, the penal provisions
of section 501 of the Act may not
be depended on to stop wire tapping. To make them effective would
require a stern enforcement of the
provision, and it is doubtful
whether the law enforcing agencies
are going to be subject to rigid
prosecution.
In light of these loopholes in the
statute, so far as the holdings in
the principal cases are based on the
premise that barring the evidence
will stop the practice of wire tapping, the efficacy of the decisions
is open to doubt.
JACK JACOBS.

"BOOKIES"

AS DIsoRDERLY PERY.] Recent increased
activities by the U. S. Department
of Justice in an attempt to dispel
the "bookie" nuisance through cutting off telephone communications
and "wire systems" may be the result of ineffective state action in
curbing this form of gambling.
Various impediments in the way of
State action may be the reason for
that ineffectiveness-legalized betting on horse races; absence of any
definite constitutional or statutory
outlawing of gambling and, more
particularly, book-making; difficulty of fitting book-making into
any of the statutory crime provisions; the difficulty of getting
sufficient admissible evidence to
support the charge and secure conviction; and, possibly, ineffectual
provisions for punishment. Against
that background a recent New
York case is of interest; it shows
how one jurisdiction has dealt with
SONS.-[N.

the problem in a rather unusual
way.
Defendant, in People v. Erickson,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 997 (1939), was
charged with being a disorderly
person under the "Disorderly Persons" provision, Penal Law of N. Y.
§899(5), which designates as disorderly those "Persons who have
no visible profession or calling by
which to maintain themselves, but
who do so, for the most part, by
gaming." Defendant voluntarily
testified that he was a professional
bookmaker, specializing in betting
on horse races, that he maintained
offices in New York and New
Jersey, that he maintained a "wire
room" and a number of telephones
to communicate with "agents" in
the city and in various parts of the
country, many of his bets originating outside of New York, and that
his New York office was the "collect and pay off" headquarters.
Defendant's counsel argued that
the Disorderly Persons section was
directed at those people who could
not maintain themselves and thereby would be a burden on the public, and, as evidence was introduced showing that the defendant
had more than $250,000 in cash and
securities the defendant could not
be a "Disorderly Person." The City
Magistrate's Court found defendant
to be a disorderly person within
the statute and required $10,000
surety that he would be of good
behavior for one year.
The instant case illustrates a
novel method of convicting "bookies." It raises the question of how
broad a field of activity is circumscribed by the misdemeanor of
being a disorderly person, and
whether such activities as bookmaking, not disorderly in the sense
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that a disturbance is created, are
included in its limits and may be
stopped thereby.
The practice of bookmaking is
prohibited in most states either by
anti-gambling statutes, which have
generally been construed to include betting on horse races and
selling turf pools, though a few
jurisdictions have held otherwise
(see 24 Am. Juris. 412; and anno.
in 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899; 33 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 827; 6 Ann. Cases 693;
52 A. L. R. 51), or by specific statutes making bookmaking illegal.
Since New York has statutes of
both types (Penal Law of N. Y.:
§970 on "Common Gamblers" and
§986 on "persons who engage in
pool-selling or bookmaking") it is
interesting to notice the use of a
disorderly person statute in the instant case--obviously an indirect
means of convicting the offender.
"Bookies", however, have often
been convicted indirectly under
statutory and common law offenses
other than the specific offense of
gaming. These include common
law and statutory nuisance, "disorderly house," common gambler
provisions, and vagrancy. Probably the one most commonly used
has been public nuisance. At common law gaming was not of itself
unlawful. See Jenks v. Turpin, 13
L. A. Q. B. D. 505 (1884); Clark &
Marshall, Crimes (2d ed., 1915)
§466. However, the common law
did recognize the offense of "public
nuisance," and this comprehended
the keeping of gaming houses. Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors
(8th ed., 1923) 1754, says of gaming houses: "Common Gaming
Houses are a public nuisance at
Common Law, being a detriment to
the public as they promote cheat-

ing and other corrupt practices;
and incite to idleness and avaricious ways of gaining property
persons whose time might otherwise be employed for the good of
the community." cf. 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 836.
The Penal Law of New York,
§1530, provides that anything
which "offends against the public
decency" is a public nuisance, a
provision broad enough, perhaps,
to include bookmaking.
Another related offense which
has been used is that of keeping a
disorderly house. According to
Bishop on Criminal Law this offense is of wide meaning. It includes "bawdy houses, common
gaming-houses, and other places of
like character, to which people
promiscuously resort for purposes
injurious to the public morals, or
health, or convenience, or safety,
all of which are indictable as public nuisance." 1 Bishop, Criminal
Law (9th ed., 1923) §1106.
It is interesting to note that under neither of these offenses must
the act create a disturbance or actually be disorderly. Thus where
the bookie business was conducted
in a private office no actual disturbance was required to make it
a public nuisance. Ehrlich v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 742, 102 S. W.
289 (1907); comment (1921) Mich.
L. Rev. 449. This is the general
rule. And so in King v. People, 83
N. Y. 587 (1881) it was said that it
was not an essential element of the
offense of keeping a disorderly or
gaming house that the public
should be disturbed by noise.
In contrast to "public nuisance"
and "disorderly house," which are
aimed at preventing the maintenance of gambling places them-
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selves, are statutory offenses based
upon the conduct and habits of the
accused. These, primarily common
gambler (see 24 Am. Jur. 430) and
vagrancy, have provided a further
indirect means of attacking bookmaking. Because the statute under
which defendant was indicted in
the instant case closely resembles
the ordinary vagrancy statute it is
interesting to see whether bookmaking is one of acts which a vagrancy provision ordinarily includes. The English Vagrancy Act
of 1824 made the practice of gaming in public places or maintaining
lotteries punishable.
Comment
(1931) 72 Law Jour. 225. A similar
statute exists in Ontario. See Rex
v. Ellis, 20 Ont. L. 218 (1909).
The offense generally includes a
variety of acts such as consorting
with criminal offenders, being a
habitual drunkard, loitering in
public without a visible means of
livelihood, etc. While some vagrancy statutes, e. g. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1939) §578, include provisions
concerning habitual frequenting of
gaming houses, these provisions
have seldom been invoked to convict persons operating betting exchanges. The primary purpose of
the vagrancy statutes, however, is
to prevent idlers and others from
becoming a public charge and in
this line of reasoning 'some cases
under typical vagrancy statutes
have said it is essential there be no
visible means of support. Horton
v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. 218, 280 S.W.
804 (1926). The New York Vagrancy statute also seems to make
lack of a visible means of support
an essential fact to conviction. It
reads, in part: "The following are
persons who are vagrants. 1. A
person who, not having visible

means to maintain himself, lives
without employment; [going on to
drunkards, prostitutes, etc.] ... '
Penal Law of N. Y., §887. The employment requirement, however,
has been interpreted to mean only
work of a lawfully gainful nature.
People v. Cramer, 247 N. Y. S. 821
(1930). The defense, in the case at
bar, relied on the close similarity
between the Disorderly Persons
and Vagrancy provisions, arguing
that the evidence of wealth foreclosed any conviction. In light of
the case on lawful nature of employment, supra, and the fact that
the conduct of defendant was ad-mittedly unlawful, this defense, as
the court suggested, becomes very
tenuous even if the defendant's
construction of the disorderly persons provision is accepted.
But it seems impossible to accept the defendant's contention
that the statute was only aimed at
those who are likely to become
public charges, without doing injustice to the language of the
statute which directly states that
it alplies to people "who have no
visible profession or calling by
which to maintain themselves but
who do so [maintain themselves]
for the most part by gaming."
(Italics supplied.) The word maintain in the latter phrase (included
by implication by the words "do
so") can clearly not be synonymous with its use in the first part
without cutting the heart out of
the statute. The effect of saying,
as did the instant case, that lack
of visible means of support is unnecessary where the support is
that of gaming seems, however, to
make the first phrase meaningless.
In other words, while lack of visible means of support is not suffi-
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cient of itself, if it is shown that
defendant maintained himself in
the most part by gaming that is
sufficient and constitutes the offense. The fact is, that the provision seems to be a hybrid of a
gaming offense and a vagrancy offense anomalously placed under a
Disorderly Persons statute.
This disorderly persons statute is
in broad terms, made up of nine
sections covering crimes varying in
nature from abandoning one's wife
to telling fortunes. Evidently it is
not a statutory designation of the
offense disorderly "conduct" specifically but rather a defining of
who are disorderly "persons."
Though it seems to comprehend a
mode of behavior or habit, a general practice of engaging in certain conduct, rather than particular acts themselves, there does
not seem to be any substantial difference in result from the situation
where the offense is disorderly
"conduct." Both offenses are misdemeanors, and are directed at socially undesirable action of a similar nature.
In so far as the instant statute
tries to bring bookmaking into the
general category of disorderly conduct it is rather unusual. At common law there was no offense of
disorderly conduct as such and it
apparently is a purely statutory
offense. People v. Galpern, 259
N. Y. 279, 181 N. E. 572, 83 A. L. R.
785 (1932). The common law offenses most nearly akin to and
probably the origin of disorderly
conduct are "Affray" and "Breach
of the Peace." May, Criminal Law
(1938, 4th Ed.) §107. However, the
statutes have not been limited to
acts which disturb the peace, but
have rather embraced those acts

which tend to corrupt morals or
offend the public's sense of decency. They commonly include
such conduct as the use of obscene
language, disobeying a policeman,
etc., though they may include idleness or vagrancy. Re Win. Stegenga, 133 Mich. 55, 61 L. R. A.
763 (1903). Whether acts punishable as disorderly must in fact be
disorderly, i.e., must create a disturbance, seems to be in doubt.
There was no apparent attempt by
counsel in instant case to defend
on that ground, although some
writers and cases indicate that the
general requirement is that the
conduct disturb the public or annoy individuals. 10 Minn. L. R.
538 (1926); L. R. A. 1917 D 694;
Larson v. Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162
N. W. 275 (1917). And that seems
to have been one of the elements
in the related common law offenses
of affray and breach of the peace.
Many courts have, however, been
liberal in construing these statutes
and have not required that the action be disorderly to be punishable. Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 108 Ky.
621, 57 S. W. 491 (1900); Garvin v.
Waynesboro, 15 Ga. App. 633, 84
S. E. 90 (1915); and anno. 18
Corpus Juris. (1919) 1217. This
has its roots in the common-law
concept that breach of peace included conduct ordinarily tending
to disturb the peace. May, Criminal
Law (4th ed., 1938) §107.
The statute in the instant cash
goes beyond codification of the
common law offense of breach of
peace from which disorderly conduct seems to have sprung, and includes matter generally found in
vagrancy, nuisance, and gaming
statutes. The particular subdivision involved had been 'in exist-
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ence for 110 years, and, said the
court, had never been used in any
opinion. In light of the several
other New York provisions which
either directly or indirectly cover
bookmaking this is not unusual;
but it does raise a question as to
what motivated the prosecutor to
use this statute. Of course, he may
merely have desired to test its
validity, but other more cogent
reasons come to mind.
The problem of proof may, perhaps, be more difficult under the
gambling statute. If either the betting, gambling, or bookmaking provisions were used it is probable
that the state would have to prove
that an actual wager was made.
While this is by no means impossible to prove (See Commonwealth
v. Clancy, 154 Mass. 128, 27 N. E.
1001 (1891); People v. Weithoff, 51
Mich. 203, 16 N. W. 442 (1883) it
is hampered by problems of entrapment and illegal evidence since
witnesses are hard to obtain and
officers must make their own bets.
While most courts say proof need
only be inferential under gaming
statutes, the New York Court has
said that mere possession of gambling devices cannot constitute a
crime. People v. Wynn, 12 N. Y. S.
379, L. R. A. 1915 D. 682 (1890);
and see 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 546;
Parkes v. Judge of Recorder's
Court, 236 Mich. 460, 210 N. W. 492
(1926). Moreover, since persons
fostering these "rackets" are the
ones that must be punished in
order to combat these practices,
and because they are usually in
the background directing the crime
activities, it becomes difficult to
sufficiently prove commission of
acts amounting to gambling which
are usually done by agents. Like-
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wise, it might also be difficult to
show that the "head of the racket"
would come within gambling provisions aimed at punishing persons
who "own, lease, hire, and superintend rooms and apparatus used
in gambling" since he may be so
far removed from actual gaming
that it is difficult to prove he is
owner or superintendent. Consequently, to apprehend persons running the racket from behind the
scenes, a statute such as the one
used here seems indispensable.
Though the defendant here made
admissions sufficient to convict him
under the gaming statutes, such
voluntary admission generally cannot be obtained and, therefore, this
method of looking to the source of
the racketeer's income and livelihood (witness the recent use of
income tax evasion to punish gamblers) becomes a useful and more
workable means for securing conviction. Since accused must show
a visible means of support in order
to defend himself, he will have to
do some "high-class" falsifying to
avoid conviction if that means of
support turns out to be gambling.
Another explanation, apart from
the difficulty of proof and fitting
defendant into a gaming act provision, may be the difference in
punishment. The gaming statute
provides for a $50.00 fine and six
months imprisonment; under the
Disorderly Persons section the defendant must be of good behavior
for the period of one year and
surety may be required therefore,
the surety being forfeited on the
doing of any act which made him
a disorderly person. In the instant
case $10,000 surety was required;
this, coupled with the threat of
forfeiture may be more effective in
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restraining the crime than six
months in jail and may explain the
use of this particular statute.
Regardless of the motive behind
the use of this statute it does appear to be an effective means for
dealing with this class of offenders
which often defies conviction. And
it affords an example that other
jurisdictions might follow either by
application and judicial expansion
of existing vagrancy statutes or enacting similar legislation. However, it may be unnecessary to do
either of these since as this court
says, quoting Blackstone, "Our
laws against gaming are not so
deficient as ourselves and our
magistrates in putting those laws
into execution."
LyNON GA-MiELSON

PEACEFUL PICKETING AS DisoRDERLY" CoNDUcT.-[N. Y.] The
case of People v. Bellows, 22 N. E.
(2d) 238 (N. Y., 1939) presents a
questionable application of the
comprehensive New York disorderly conduct statute. (Penal
Law of N. Y., §722(2).)
The complainant in this case was
the sole proprietor and operator of
a small shop in Brooklyn. He purchased a neon sign which was
erected by members of a union. A
rival union affiliated with the A. F.
of L. immediately picketed the
store, the two defendants carrying
posters stating that the maintenance of certain signs on the premises was unfair to their union. The
complaint alleged that the defendants committed the crime of disorderly conduct in violation of subdivision 2 of section 722 of the
Penal Code in that, "with intent to
provoke a breach of the peace and
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whereby a breach of the peace
might be occasioned the defendants
committed acts which annoyed,
disturbed, interfered with, obstructed and was offensive to the
complainant."
The magistrate in People v. Bellows found that the defendants
were guilty of disorderly conduct,
that they had annoyed the plaintiff,
obstructed his place of business
and created a disturbance to the
extent that a breach of the peace
might have been occasioned. On
appeal the Court of Special Sessions reversed this decision, saying, "In our opinion the record
abundantly justifies the finding that
the picketing was peaceful and
free from disorder. That being so
the defendant is entitled to an acquittal." People v. Bellows, 9 N. Y.
S. (2d) 850 (1939). The Court of
Appeals reversed and ordered a
new trial after stating: "We differ
from the Special Sessions and hold
that such picketing which has been
declared unlawful does constitute
disorderly conduct according to the
conceded facts of the case. People
v. Jenkins, 246 N. Y. S. 444, 255
N. Y. 637 (1931); Goldfinger v.
Finetuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E.
(2d) 910 (1937); Canepa v. Doe,
277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d) 790
(1938). Lehman, J., dissented on
the ground, "that the picketing in
the case, even if unlawful, did not
constitute disorderly conduct."
Judge Lehman's statement in
People v. Bellows of what he believes the law to be is more compatible with earlier New York
holdings than is the majority holding. The prior attitude of the court
had been that notwithstanding the
fact that a magistrate was entitled
to a reasonable exercise of dis-
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cretion in determining that conduct that did not fall strictly within
the offense defined by the legislature may nevertheless constitute
disorderly conduct, that discretion
is not without limits and must be
limited to acts which reasonably
tend to a breach of the peace.
People v. Schroedman, 232 N. Y. S.
302 (1929); People v. Sinclair, 149
N. Y. S. 54 (1914); People v.
Squires, 238 N. Y. S. 152 (1929);
People v. Nixon,.248 N. Y. 182, 161
N. E. 463 (1928). While it may be
true that disorderly conduct need
not create a disturbance to be punishable that is generally true where
the statute is based upon conduct
that offends public morals or decency. See supra, at -; 17 Am.
Juris. 99; 18 Corpus Juris. 1217.
Where, however, the statute is
based upon breach of peace, as in
the instant case, the statutory intent would seem to require that
some disorder be created or threatened, and a holding that mere illegality of the conduct (for civil
purposes) makes it disorderly
seems an unduly harsh interpretation of the law. See Larson v.
Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162 N. W. 538
(1917); Anno. 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 75.
The question of the legality of
the picketing which seems to be
the basis of the holding in People
v. Bellows was mentioned in earlier
New York cases (Sengenfeld v.
Friedman, 193 N. Y. S. 128 (1922);
People v. Wecker, 246 N. Y. S. 708
(1930)), which hold that peaceful
picketing is lawful if carried on
for a lawful purpose. The logical
inference is that picketing which is
illegal will be enjoined. This was
the view of the Special Sessions
which reversed the findings of the
magistrate in the Bellows case; the

court said, "The answer to the
question of whether or not the defendants were guilty of disorderly
conduct under section 722 of the
Penal Code is not to be found in
an analysis of the relation between
the unions or in a consideration
of the rights of the parties concerned to seek injunctive relief
upon appropriate application to the
civil courts. . . . There exists a
confusion of civil and criminal
remedies. No burden rests upon
the defendant to establish his right
to picket. The burden is upon the
People to establish the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt." Any such hiatus between
civil and criminal remedies was
evidently disregarded by the Court
of Appeals as two of the cases cited
to support its position, Goldfinger
v. Finetuch, supra, and Canepa v.
Doe, supra,involve applications for
injunctive relief, the granting or
refusal of which was contingent
upon the establishment of a recognized labor dispute. The case of
People v. Jenkins, supra, was a disorderly conduct conviction for
carrying untruthful signs in the
absence of a strike.
Though the result in People v.
Bellows is not incomprehensible it
is nevertheless questionable. A
disorderly conduct statute which
included a provision specifically
stating that peaceful picketing in a
secondary boycott was illegal and
hence disorderly might be in
danger of being declared partially
if not completely invalid under the
provisions of many state constitutions which require that no legislative act shall embrace more than
expressed in the title. Cooley,
Const. Lim. (8th ed., 1927) 291-313;
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Cf. People v. Hoffman, 322 Ill. 174,
152 N. E. 597 (1926).
Though not generally recognized,
by far the greatest number of arrests and prosecutions arising out
of the labor disputes are for criminal offenses rather than for violations of labor injunctions. Few of
the arrests are made under statutes
relating specifically to labor disputes and the majority of all arrests have been for misdemeanors
rather than for felonies. Disrderly conduct, obstructing traffic,
disturbing the peace, trespass, intimidation, malicious mischief and
unlawful assembly are the most
frequently utilized charges under
the state statutes. At times the
wholesale utilization of criminal
statutes produces rather disconcerting results as in the case of an
Indianapolis ordinance prohibiting
the placing of signs over sidewalks
or streets without a permit, which
was made the basis of police court
prosecution in 1916 of pickets who
carried placards on their backs
calling attention to a labor union
boycott. There have been, however, grave and inexcusable abuses,
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such as the imposition of excessive
bail in petty offenses and long imprisonments awaiting trials which
may never take place. See Witte,
The Government in Labor Disputes
(1932) 156. The invariable consequences of the injudicious application of criminal statutes to situations in which they are clearly
inapplicable is resentment, antagonism and misunderstanding on the
part of those affected. The decision
in People v. Bellows serves ends
of expediency primarily rather
than adhering to the purpose of
the Penal statute. One possible explanation of the decision might be
the recent limitations on injunctive relief in New York, N. Y. Civil
Practice Act, §876a, and the statutory requirement of a jury trial
in suits to punish for contempt
may have prompted the use of the
charge of disorderly conduct as a
means of combatting unlawful
picketing. 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 216
(1936). The result is a perversion,
not only of the disorderly conduct
statute, but of the policy of the
anti-injunction act.
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